Norms, Empiricism, and Canons
in Statutory Interpretation
William N. Eskridge, Jr.t
In the abstract, there should be little quarrel with the proposition that theories of statutory interpretation should be subjected to empirical testing.' Pragmatic thinkers and practitioners
ought to be open to any theory that has a "cash-value," as philosopher William James put it.2 If an uncompromising application
of statutory plain meaning, what I have called the "new textualism," produces more predictable results than eclectic theories now
deployed by pragmatic judges and scholars, then theory and practice ought to move toward textualism, even more than they already have.' If studies deploying a variety of rigorous techniques
show that following a textualist approach generates more consistent and uniform interpretations by a variety of different judges
than other approaches to statutory interpretation (original intent, purpose), pragmatists ought to consider those findings as a
significant reason to support and adopt a more strictly textual
approach to statutory interpretation.
Many formalists appreciate the Jamesian insight. Text-based
theories of statutory interpretation are usually justified in part
by factual claims. For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia argues
that judges should not consult legislative history because such
materials (1) are an illegitimate source of statutory meaning under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, which renders the text
the only source of law and augurs against crediting the views of
congressional subgroups; (2) are unreliable and often misleading
evidence of legislative deals, and hence are not worth the re-

t John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. Thanks to Cass Sunstein for a stimulating paper and to the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review
for their patience.
' For examples, see Cass R. Sunstein, Must FormalismBe Defended Empirically?, 66
U Chi L Rev 636 (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textuallsm, The Unknown Ideal?, 96
Mich L Rev 1509, 1541-42 (1998).
' "Pragmatism ... asks its usual question. 'Grant an idea or belief to be true,' it says,
'what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life?... What, in
short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms? William James, Pragmatism:A
New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (Longmans 1907), excerpted in John J.
McDermott, ed, The Writings of William James 430 (Chicago 1977).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621 (1990).
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search expended by lawyers and judges; and (3) increase the discretion of willful judges to read statutes to reflect their own preferences.4 Only the first is a purely formalist argument for Scalia's
formalist theory; the latter two mix functional and normative arguments for the theory, and the functional aspect of each might
be tested empirically or quasi-empirically. Like Scalia, most of
the other leading statutory formalists have provided functional as
well as formal reasons in favor of their theories.'
Subjecting theories of statutory interpretation to systematic
factual testing, therefore, should be potentially attractive to both
formalists and pragmatists. Empirical work might expand arenas
of consensus among scholars and judges about the latter's appropriate role and reasoning in statutory cases. For example, if testing revealed that purpose-based theories of statutory interpretation
yielded completely unpredictable applications by different judges,
support for purposivism as a general theory would diminish. Even
if such work did not immediately eliminate arenas of disagreement, the results would be intrinsically interesting and illuminating-we would know more about the application of statutes by
interpreters. Additionally, empiricism might improve the quality of
the normative debate, if it grounded arguments in concrete reality
and forced each side to understand the weaknesses or gaps in its
respective arguments. Finally, descriptive work that does not contribute to current normative debate is potentially useful. As we
have learned from the natural sciences, data irrelevant now might
become relevant to future debates and might even impel scholars to
reconsider the focus of debate.
On the other hand, it is not clear that empirical testing will
eliminate or even reduce normative disagreement. It might even

Antonin Scalia, A Matterof Interpretation:FederalCourts and the Law 29-37 (Princeton 1997). See also John Manning, Textualism as a NondelegationDoctrine, 97 Colum L
Rev 673 (1997) (arguing that judicial reliance on legislative history allows bill sponsors
and committee members in effect to say what a law means, allowing other members of
Congress to express dissenting understandings of the law, thereby escaping the negative
political consequences of having voted for it).
' See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833, 1891-95
(1998); Martin H. Redish and Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalismin Statutory Interpretation, 68 Tulane L Rev
803, 871-73 (1994); Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute
Rule ofStatutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich L Rev 177 (1989); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified IntentionalistApproach, 63 Tulane L Rev 1 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term: Foreword:
The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 14-18, 42-59 (1984).
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increase such disagreement. Nor is it inevitable that empiricism
will increase our stock of factual information. The reason is that
facts and values cannot always be disentangled. Consider the
phenomenon at a general level. Presumptions are critical in normative argumentation: Where you start is usually where you end
up. Presumptions affect or even determine the cash-value of factual findings. A theorist for whom textualism is presumptively
the best normative theory (Justice Scalia) will be more easily
satisfied with equivocal empirical support for the theory than
would a theorist for whom other theories are presumptively better (Justice Breyer). Empirical studies are typically beset with
questions about whether their conclusions are reliable, significant, and generalizable. When there is room for quarrel or dubiety, presumptions will either trump empirical findings or, more
subtly, influence the way the reader understands as well as
evaluates such findings. If you are strongly committed to your
normative starting point, that commitment will not only raise the
bar for contrary evidence to change your mind but will pervasively influence the way you read that evidence.
The nature of presumptions also renders the factual inquiry
potentially regressive, and either circular or endless. Presumptions themselves are a mix of factual and normative considerations. A statutory interpreter who thinks it morally important to
find and apply the original expectations of the enacting legislature
is also more likely to believe that such an imaginative reconstruction is actually possible most if not all the time. Conversely, an interpreter who believes that imaginative reconstruction is possible
or even easy in the typical case is more likely to find the enterprise
valuable. The factual features of a presumption might be tested
empirically, but can they be separated from the normative features? Not immediately, opined William James. Because our
mind approaches matters holistically rather than compartmentally, such separation is not usually possible, although James believed minds can change slowly as they adapt to new information.6
These points about presumptions are not only generally applicable to statutory interpretation discourse, but specifically relate to the main body of statutory interpretation doctrine,
namely, the canons of statutory construction. The canons are on
their face formal presumptions or rules about statutory meaning.
' James, Pragmatismat 382-83, 418-19 (cited in note 2).
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In our collection of Supreme Court canons, Philip Frickey and I
suggested that canons belong to three different categories.! Some
are linguistic presumptions about what statutory language
means. For example, the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
(the inclusion of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others)
presumes that, when Congress composes lists of matters included
in a statute, omitted matters are not covered by the statute.
Other canons are presumptions about extrinsic sources. Canons
about deployment of legislative history fall into this category, but
the most important extrinsic source canon is the presumption or
rule that courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes
they are charged with enforcing, unless Congress has clearly legislated otherwise. Most canons are neither linguistic nor extrinsic
source rules but are substantive in nature. The best example is
the rule of lenity, which presumes that ambiguous penal statutes
will be construed against the state.
The force of the canons depends upon the willingness ofjudges
to internalize their presumptions and not just deploy the canons as
window-dressing for interpretations reached on other grounds.
There has long been a vigorous debate over the utility of the canons. They have been reviled by the leading statutory theorists,' but
they dominate judicial opinions and have found a new generation of
fans.9 After decades of discussion and experience, it is far from clear
that the debate has been resolved or even been advanced. Would
empirical testing advance or resolve some of the debate? Consider
three normative defenses of the canons, the empirical issues suggested within them, and the hidden normative commitments that
might impede consensus even if the data prove one-sided.

' William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Tenn:
Foreword:Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 65-71, 97-108 (1994); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as
ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593 (1992).
' Notable exceptions include Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1191 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds); Samuel Mermin, Law and the Legal System:An Introduction264-65 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1982).
' See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation275306 (Harvard 1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation,
1990 Wis L Rev 1179; Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103
Harv L Rev 405, 451-62 (1989).
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1. Democracy Justifications
A most attractive justification would be that the canons supply details to statutory schemes that the legislature would probably have provided if its members had written a more detailed
statute.' In our polity, statutory legitimacy is closely linked to
representative democracy. The people participate in lawmaking
indirectly but powerfully by choosing representatives who reflect
their preferences and by monitoring the representatives' performance through subsequent elections. If courts follow rules of
interpretation that faithfully reflect the preferences of those representatives (and, indirectly, of the citizenry as well), those rules
have a strong claim to legitimacy on the basis of the democratic
values they serve.
If I have put the issue properly, this would appear to be a
case where empirical testing would be useful and might narrow
or even resolve disagreement. There is overlapping consensus
about the central normative claim that statutes should have a
close tie to representative democracy: the claim finds support in
the Constitution as well as contemporary popular attitudes, in
America's historical experience as well as political theory, among
liberals and conservatives alike. To evaluate the canons under
this uncontroversial criterion requires factual judgments, and
academic detective work might be able to inform or even establish
these factual judgments.
Yet even in cases like this, where there is much normative
agreement, it will typically be hard to devise a proper empirical
test. For example, if legislators should find congenial the canon of
deference to agency interpretations as a general matter, this
canon might be defensible on democracy grounds. But how could
that proposition be tested? One could poll members of Congress,
but cooperation might not be forthcoming, and a current poll
would not tell us what prior Congresses thought. It would also be
hard to pose the issue reliably. A member might say yes to the
inquiry, "Should courts generally defer to agencies?," while also
saying yes to the inquiry, "Should courts refuse to defer to unreliable agencies or agencies that are ideologically slanted?" While

"0Debate over

this justification is usually set at a general level: Congress generally,

and not the specific Congress in question, would fill in statutory lacunae in the specified
way. See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretationat 28-29 (cited in note 4) (critiquing rules of
construction); Sunstein, 66 U Chi L Rev at 645-46, 653-55 (cited in note 1) (discussing interpretive rules that "mimic" the market).
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perhaps not insuperable, these and other conundrums complicate
the project of empirical testing."
Often, the problem with empirical testing will be normative
as well as technical. Consider the inclusio unius canon. Although
this is one of the most frequently invoked linguistic canons, it
strikes me as an unreliable rule of thumb about the ordinary use
of language. My judgment might be tested, without insuperable
design problems. Linguists have gained valuable experience conducting empirical studies to determine how words are regularly
used, and they have recently teamed up with law professors to
figure out the ordinary meaning of statutory terms and sentences. 2 In everyday parlance, are lists considered exhaustive?
My hypothesis would be that inclusio unius is only sometimes a
reliable maxim, and whether it's reliable depends on normative
baselines in the particular case. For example, if Sally is kicking
and pushing her little brother and Mother says, "Stop kicking
and pushing your brother," Sally has no valid inclusio unius argument authorizing her to choke her hapless sibling. The list in
the directive would be read to stand for a more general principle
(no hurting) that would be fairly enforceable against Sally. On
the other hand, if Mother tells Sally, "You can have one cookie
and one scoop of chocolate ice cream," inclusio unius is applicable
if Mother strictly regulates the children's consumption of sweets.
The list in the directive would be read to stand for a limited
authorization for Sally to depart from the general principle (no
sweets).
The foregoing thought experiments suggest a deep problem
with testing legal canons and theories. Empirical testing is only
worthwhile if set at a general level: "Do ordinary speakers usu-

" Personally, I would find a casually empirical approach illuminating. Casual empiricism would include interviews with members of Congress and their staffs and accounts by
former players in the legislative process. See, for example, James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich L Rev 1 (1994) (drawing in part on the comments of former members of
Congress and on the author's experience as a Senate staffer to argue that courts should
look to legislative history in interpreting statutes). Such materials would have to be discounted in terms of representativeness, but they could provide us with thicker descriptions of the process and a much better basis for judgment. To have a cash-value, evidence
does not have to dispel all doubt; a story that changes my probability assessment from 35
percent to 40 percent has a significant cash-value.
12See, for example, Clark D. Cunningham, et al, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103
Yale L J 1561 (1994). Empirical canvassing of how words are regularly used is now showing up in judicial opinions. See, for example, the debate between the majority and the dissent in Muscarello v United States, 118 S Ct 1911 (1998).
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ally imply exclusion of omitted items when they compile lists?"
Or, "Does Congress generally want courts to defer to agencies?"
Even if the answer to these questions is generally "yes," it is always going to be a "yes, but"-yes, but not if inconsistent with the
overall statutory policy or constitutional values or human reason.
The establishment of a "yes, but" presumption has accomplished
little or nothing, for it just shifts the inquiry about where the presumption lies from the general to the particular, and the particular cannot be predicted. Even if inclusio unius is the correct
presumption most of the time, the statutory interpreter ought not
rely on it unless she engages in the statutory purpose inquiry
and, in some cases, in a more ambitious constitutional inquiry.
Another complexity arises from the institutional context within
which statutes are enacted. Because statutes are adopted by legislatures acting under a procedurally and politically messy system of bicameralism, executive presentment, and multiple vetogates,'3 any testing of the inclusio unius maxim should consider
the institutional context. When statutes contain lists, we should
ask not only, "Would the typical legislator expect no new items to
be added in the context of this statutory policy?," but also, "Does
the institutional context militate against comprehensive lists?"
Law professors could work with political scientists to explore the
latter question empirically. But I doubt that even the most rigorous such examination would eliminate, and it might not even reduce, the key role played by normative baselines and the context
of the directive. It may be that inclusio unius is most appropriately applied to a lengthy list of exclusions from a statute, if the
legislature debated the list and edited it through amendment.
This proposition is agreeable, if at all, for reasons that are normative (legislative deliberation makes me more willing to stick to
the letter of the statute) as much as factual (this is how the typical legislator would understand her text to be applied). And, as
before, the particular normative context of the statute being interpreted will make a difference. A list of actors covered by Title
VII will likely be read more expansively (civil rights laws should
be liberally applied) than a list of actors covered by a criminal
statute (rule of lenity).'4
" By "vetogate" I mean a place within a process where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed.
" The statement in the text is itself subject to, and thereby illustrates, the regressive nature of the enterprise. Whether Title VII is read broadly is going to depend on whether the interpreter believes the law has already been too expansively construed, whether the breadth
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A final problem is that even if the canons individually or
collectively (discussed below) reflect the "typical" legislature's
preferences, the canons might not be desirable under democratic
theory. Such theory might posit that legislatures depending on
courts to fill in the details of statutes are lazy organs and that
democracy demands limits on the degree of legislative delegation.
(This, in fact, is one idea underlying the rule of lenity for construing criminal statutes.) Thus, further examination is needed
to determine whether a comprehensive and preference-reflecting
canonical regime saps legislative energy or has countervailing
advantages, such as freeing up legislatures to do more productive
work. (That in turn might be objected to. Would legislatures do
work or just accomplish more mischief?) Is a canonical regime
better than its alternatives, such as a chaotic ad hocism? Conversely, the best regime might be one where most of the canons
reflected legislative preferences, but a few loose canons did not,
the better to bestir legislative deliberation in areas such as the
criminal law. (The rule of lenity is probably a loose canon.) And so
on. In short, testing begets more testing, and a new cottage industry is created.
2. Rule of Law Justifications
An important value also widely accepted in our polity is the
desirability of the rule of law. The rule of law requires that statutes-whatever their source, be it a representative legislature, a
plebescite, or a monarch-be applied in an objective, consistent,
and transparent way to citizens and others subject to the state's
authority. Courts are the guardians of the rule of law, but also a
threat to it. An independent judiciary may make it more likely
that a statute will be applied in the same way tomorrow as today,
and to the powerful and influential as well as to the miserable
and the obscure, but an independent judiciary also poses a risk
that judges will bend statutes to reflect their own political preferences. The latter would undermine our ability to predict how a
statute will be applied, and the cynical among us expect that judicial bending would be slanted in favor of persons or groups the
judge identifies with or likes.
The canons of statutory interpretation can be defended if
they generate greater objectivity and predictability in statutory
seems fair in the particular case, and so forth. The same messiness affects the rule of lenity
supposition for the list in a criminal statute.
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interpretation. The rule of lenity, for example, might assure the
squalid as well as the virtuous that their activities would not
land them in jail unless clearly covered by a criminal statute.
More important, as a collection of rules the canons might constitute an interpretive regime that both restrains judges and enables the citizenry to predict how those judges will apply ambiguous as well as clear statutes. Not least important, such an interpretive regime could serve democracy values (discussed above) as
legislators and their staffs could predict how different proposed
statutory language would be applied."5 Thus, even if ordinary
legislative readers do not follow inclusio unius or the rule of lenity in processing texts, the judiciary can induce these conventions
by putting the legislature on notice that these rules will be followed when courts apply statutes.
Few would object to the overall goal of making the law more
predictable, objective, and so forth. The debate has been whether
the canons actually constrain judges and, in turn, make statutory
application more predictable. Karl Llewellyn's famous thrustand-parry array maintained that for every canon there is a countercanon; the canons therefore have no independent value in
statutory interpretation and are just window-dressing for results
reached for other reasons.' The large majority of Llewellyn's
competing canonical couplets are presumptions about language
and extrinsic sources, followed by qualifications to the presumptions. A statute cannot go beyond its text-unless needed to effect
the statutory purpose (Llewellyn's first thrust and parry). At one
level this is unremarkable. What rule does not have exceptions? At
a deeper level, Llewellyn is making the same criticism of the rule of
law justification for the canons that I earlier made of the democracy
justification: The policy and history of the particular statute and
the facts of the particular case will determine or influence whether
the rule or the exception is the starting point. Notwithstanding this
point, the canons still might be defended on rule of law grounds.
Llewellyn ignored the substantive canons, including the rule of
lenity. By the thrust-and-parry display of individual canons and
countercanons, Llewellyn deflected attention from the most likely
value of canons-to work together as an interpretive regime,
yielding more consistent results than would exist in its absence.
"5See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation,and the
Rule ofLaw, in Ian Shapiro, ed, The Rule of Law 265 (NOMOS 1994).
1 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
CanonsAbout How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395, 401-06 (1950).
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Perhaps, empirical work can illuminate the debate Llewellyn
started. Some questions that might be investigated include the
following:
" Would one hundred judges told to follow the canons in an
ordinary case be more likely to reach the same result than
one hundred judges provided with only more general guidance (such as an instruction to apply statutory plain
meaning, legislative intent, or statutory purpose)? Do attorneys find it easier to predict how judges will construe
statutes if they understand the canonical interpretive regime?
" Is the legislature or its staff aware of the canons, either
individually or as a collective regime of rules and presumptions? If not, would awareness of the canons make
statutory drafting easier? Would legislators have better
purchase on how their statutes would be applied?
• Is there another interpretive regime (for example, another
list of canons or another way of presenting them) that
would better constrain judges or allow others to predict
their behavior?17
These are only the most obvious questions, but they illustrate the above-mentioned problems with the process of empirical
testing: How to do the tests? Are all relevant variables controlled
for? Can results be generalized, or is the interpretive enterprise
too particularistic?
The most useful rule of law test of the canons, and of more
general theories of statutory interpretation such as the new textualism, would be: Do they constrain judges or make interpretation more predictable? It would be very hard to develop a good
test of this proposition. How do you constitute the sample? 8 What
method is required to create a random sample? How can you
choose a case that will be both ordinary and representative of
many other cases? All of these quandaries could theoretically be

" This last item would be especially hard to test, because the order in which the canons
are considered might affect the results. For example, starting with the rule of lenity might
yield somewhat different consequences than ending up with it, perhaps reducing it to tiebreaker status.
" Real judges will not sit still for such an exercise, and they are already set in their
ways (therefore a corrupted sample). Law students would seem to be less corrupted by
preexisting bias, but their very lack of experience would make testing more arduous, for
one group would have to be schooled in the canons, another group in plain meaning, and
so forth. The schooling process might itself yield corrupting factors.

1999]

Norms, Empiricism, and Canons

solved over time and with repeated testing. Who has the resources to do this?19
The who-will-do-it quandary is made more acute by hidden
normative issues that threaten the relevance of even the most
rigorous empirical findings. I have treated rule of law values as
uncontroversial in our polity, but there is normative disagreement about how highly to value predictability and even objectivity in law. Specifically, there is vigorous disagreement as to
whether the law has any room for equity and mercy, whereby the
wise but harder-to-predict judge does justice in the individual
case.' In Marguerite Yourcenar's celebrated account, the Roman
Emperor Hadrian opined that the future of the state depended
upon construction of the laws that allowed for mercy. As an example, Hadrian cited a case where he sentenced a slave who had attacked him with a knife. Although the attack would have carried
the death penalty had "the law been applied with savage rigor," the
emperor applied the law leniently and thereby gained the loyalty of
an able servant.21 Many of us admire Hadrian's judgment and, indeed, believe that it reinforced rather than undermined the rule of
law. Unfortunately, the goal of the rule of law itself might be in
play: Is the completely predictable judge desirable? At what price
in sacrificing individuated justice?
The same point could be made about democracy. The democratic value potentially served by the canons needs to be tempered by the observation that our polity might not want statutory
interpretation always to mimic the results reached or that would
have been reached by the legislature. Alexander Hamilton argued
for an independent judiciary as "an essential safeguard against
the effects of occasional ill humors in the society" that lead to the
enactment of "unjust and partial laws."22 He specifically urged
judges to '"mitigat[e] the severity and confin[e] the operation of
such laws."' While our polity values judicial deference to demo" In his oral remarks, Cass Sunstein said that Chicago does.
"See the classic debate among fictional judges in Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv L Rev 616 (1949). For a wonderful recent example, see the debate between Judges Easterbrook and Posner in United States v Marshall, 908 F2d 1312,
1314-26, 1331-38 (7th Cir 1990) (en banc), affd as Chapman v United States, 500 US 453
(1991).
" Marguerite Yourcenar, The Memoirs of Hadrian 116-17 (Farrar, Straus and Young
1954) (Grace Frick, trans).
"Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The FederalistPapers 464, 470
(Mentor 1961).
2

Id.
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cratic values and rigorous application of the rule of law, it cannot
be said, uncontroversially, that our polity is committed to these
values without exception. Hence, the question is not just a factual
one, "Do the canons make the law more predictable (or objective
or democratic)?" Instead, the issue is a mix of normative and factual considerations, "What is the optimal level of predictability
(or objectivity or democracy), and do the canons contribute toward
that level?" Stated that way, the issue is all but impossible to test
empirically.
3. Openly Normative Justifications
Most of the substantive canons are hard if not impossible to
defend on ordinary-use-of-language or this-is-what-the-legislature-would-want grounds. Legislators inveigh against the rule of
lenity when they think about it at all; historically, some states'
legislatures have adopted statutes precluding application of the
rule of lenity in criminal cases.24 It is more likely that ordinary
speakers would expect their punitive directives to be applied with
lenity, but popular enthusiasm for strict punishment of criminal
lawbreakers renders that conclusion speculative.
In any event, most of the substantive canons might be defended by reference to normative criteria. For example, the rule
of lenity is best justified by libertarian and institutional norms:
Legislatures are prone to deploy the moral condemnation of the
criminal sanction too readily, and the judiciary is the best actor to
curtail this process and at least trim its draconian margins, especially when a person's physical liberty is at stake. These justifications might be debated on normative grounds,' but factual studies might contribute to the normative debate. Three key issues
are:
" Do legislatures overutilize the criminal sanction?
" Does the rule of lenity ameliorate some of this overutilization?
" Does the rule do so at an acceptable cost?
All three issues have obvious normative components"overutilize" and "ameliorate some" and "acceptable cost"--and
pose enormous methodological problems for any effort at rigorous
" See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Constructionof PenalStatutes, 48 Harv L Rev
748, 752-54 (1935) (noting the adoption of several state "liberal construction statutes" designed to prevent courts from construing statutes "strictly," to favor accused criminals).
Compare Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 295-96, 305-06 (cited in
note 9), with Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev 345.
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empirical study. On the other hand, all three issues do pose factual questions that might be illuminated by a more casual empiricism, including accounts by legal historians and narrativists
as well as legal sociologists and economists:
" Do legislatures often criminalize conduct later considered
to have been harmless? Is the process of criminalization
prone to hasty decisions later regretted? Does the legislature tend to overreact with draconian penalties?"
" Does the Supreme Court (or a state high court) apply the
rule of lenity in a consistent pattern? If so, does the pattern serve the constitutional values of the rule? If not, are
there features of the Court's application that nonetheless
discourage overcriminalization? Does the legislature respond when the Court narrows statutes? Do the responses
serve the goals of the rule?'
" Does the Supreme Court (or a state high court) apply the
rule of lenity in cases where the rule does not serve its underlying constitutional values? If so, does the legislature
override the Court most often in those kinds of cases? And
does the Court learn something from those overrides?
Admittedly, the inquiries implicated in the foregoing questions
are laden with normative judgments about what is "hasty" and
what is "harmless," for example. What casual empiricism can do,
and perhaps the most it can do, is provide a more informed basis for
judgment about these issues. Casual empiricism also acknowledges
the way law, like other crafts, is experiential and context-bound.
Return to the question Cass Sunstein and I have posed for
formalist theories of statutory interpretation generally and the
new textualism in particular.' Existing practice and most theory
emphasize both text and statutory context, including legislative
history scorned by the new textualists. For most of us pragmatists, the burden is on the new textualists to justify the significant changes in judicial practice their theory demands. The new

'"For a case study of how legislators and prosecutors overreacted to the visibility of
gender-bending and gay subcultures with "excessive" criminal sanctions, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., PrivacyJurisprudenceand the Apartheidof the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 Fla St
U L Rev 703, 710-33 (1997). Compare id at 777-81 (describing how the rule of lenity was
deployed, or not, in various jurisdictions).
"See Kahan, 1994 S Ct Rev 345 (cited in note 25) (arguing that the rule of lenity is
not consistently enforced by the Supreme Court and that it does not well serve its most
likely constitutional goal of nondelegation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme
Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 Yale L J 331, 348, 351, 362 (1991) (empirical
survey finding that Congress overrides Supreme Court decisions invoking the rule of lenity with a greatly disproportionate frequency).
" See sources cited in note 1.
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textualists would respond that the burden is on contextualists to
justify departure from what they consider constitutional baselines. The debate is now at impasse. Would empirical studies
break the logjam?
Not in the short or medium term. Just as democracy or rule
of law defenses of the inclusio unius and the deference to agency
canons (new textualist favorites, by the way) would be hard to establish empirically, so would the new textualists be hard pressed
to establish empirical defenses for their broader claims. The reason is a general one. Testing theories of interpretation empirically is difficult because what you're testing is hard to quantify,
the human and institutional variables are numerous and hard to
sort, and unconscious normative assumptions can bias the sampling and evaluation processes. The application of statutes to
facts is too spongy to test as rigorously as other things. In the
end, the tests may not matter because of people's preexisting
normative commitments.
In the longer term, however, empirical testing of textualism
and other theories of statutory interpretation ought to have
stronger consequences. The strongest consequences would likely be
byproducts rather than goals of Chicago-style empirical testing. Because testing would have to be collaborative, new and increased
linkages would be formed between law professors and academics in
the social and mathematical sciences. These linkages would probably have a variety of consequences, perhaps downscaling the theoretical aspirations of law professors, regularizing tenure or professional standards, and maybe even increasing judicial and lawyerly
interest in legal academics' work product. Some would view these
consequences as positive cash-values of an empirical testing project.
Others would see them as cash-deficits, to the extent they submerged deep normative issues in number-crunching and discussions of craft.

